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Conﬁ dential Information and Privacy-
Related Law in Canada and in 
International Instruments
M A R G A R E T  A N N  W I L K I N S O N
i n t ro du c t i o n
With rapid changes in technology and communications spurring 
globalization and the increasing value of information, any demon-
strated international consensus around issues central to these chan-
ges cannot be independent of power struggles and coercion between 
nations and multinationals. The history of international-intellectual 
property instruments illustrates shifting international views on tech-
nology and communication as globalization has evolved and the 
value of information in the new world economy has become evi-
dent.1 This shift has occurred simultaneously with the realization of 
a borderless communication world and virtual communities. More 
and more individuals in every society fi nd themselves involved with 
intellectual-property interests that in the industrial age were in the 
purview of and preoccupied relatively few.
As intellectual property becomes more democratized in its reach 
and impact through the new technology and new mass media, its 
increasing diffusion brings it more frequently into the realm of other 
interests and values that are the subject of international attention, 
including privacy, education, and access to information.2 The novel-
ty and increasing frequency of these intersections should give na-
tions pause before they pursue single-mindedly intellectual-property 
strategies that proved useful in the industrial era.3 Where intellec-
tual-property policies have been developed in virtual isolation from 
consideration of intersections with other areas of law and where 
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countries have bound themselves to such policies before recognizing 
or evaluating these intersections, it would seem prudent to put off 
implementation of undertakings given in the intellectual-property 
sphere.4 This chapter will explore these themes with a particular 
focus on the emerging area, claimed as intellectual property in inter-
national instruments, of confi dential information. It will explore the 
intersection between this putative form of intellectual property and 
the development of personal-data protection (which is a reaction to 
increased concern over privacy values).
c o n f i d e n t i a l  i n f o r m at i o n 
as  i n t e l l e c t ua l  p ro p e rt y
The term “intellectual property” was not known when the earliest 
intellectual-property devices came into the law.5 Trademark, argu-
ably the earliest of the devices, has its antecedents in antiquity, in the 
craftspersons’ mark. Patent and copyright, however, arise directly 
from the industrial and print revolutions.6 These three categories 
form the most widely recognized triumvirate in intellectual property 
– but they were more frequently separated in the nineteenth century 
than they are in the popular mind today. Trademark and patent were 
recognized as “industrial property,” whereas copyright was general-
ly considered on its own.
Patent and copyright were the result of a relatively long line of 
social, and hence legal, experimentation with attempts to intervene 
and control various markets.7 Patent was an exception to a general 
prohibition against national monopolies: it was recognized that 
the investments in technology required to advance an industry in 
the industrial age merited a guarantee of reward.8 Copyright was 
also developed as an incentive to the industrial middleman to in-
vest in the technology necessary to compete in the age of the press.9 
Trademark, on the other hand, appears to have developed more or 
less as a very early form of consumer protection law.10 But over the 
years all three have had in common a public interest aspect that con-
tinues to distinguish them from other forms of property interest.11 
For example, in patent the Supreme Court of Canada has twice re-
cently reiterated that two of the central objectives of the Patent Act 
are “to advance research and development and to encourage broad-
er economic activity.”12 Justice Binnie has been explicit about this 
process: “Having disclosed to the public the secrets of how to make 
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or use the invention, the inventor can prevent unauthorized people 
for a limited time from taking a “free ride” in exploiting the infor-
mation thus disclosed. At the same time, persons skilled in the art of 
the patent are helped to further advance the frontiers of knowledge 
by standing on the shoulders of those who have gone before.”13
Both patent and copyright are limited-term monopolies, after 
which the inventions and works to which they pertain enter into the 
normal competitive marketplace. In patent, the information about 
the invention is required to be published immediately, to advance 
the state of knowledge in the area of the invention, even though the 
right to manufacture, sell, use, and distribute the invention is held 
in the monopoly for a period of years. In copyright, the ideas and 
facts that are contained in an expression circulate freely in society 
throughout the period of the copyright monopoly: only certain uses 
of the expression of those ideas and facts are limited to the monop-
oly holder. Of course, not being held in a monopoly does not neces-
sarily mean that it will be possible to access the information for 
free, but rather it opens up the market to other suppliers of the same 
expression, which is “an opportunity to produce new editions at a 
cheaper price and hence with wider circulation.”14 Making expres-
sions available to the public actually occurs more through deposi-
tory schemes,15 through access legislation, and through such 
mechanisms as Canadian content regulations in broadcasting, than 
through the presence or absence of copyright protection. But cer-
tain uses of a copyrighted work have not been traditionally includ-
ed in copyright and are thus always available to the public if the 
work is available in any form – for example, reading a literary 
work. In trademark, the entire value of the mark rests with the pub-
lic’s recognition of it and association of it with particular goods: if 
the mark is unrecognized or no longer associated in the public eye 
with particular goods, then the mark cannot be defended by its 
owner against any other user.
What, on the other hand, is the public interest in the protection of 
confi dential information? If no public interest can be identifi ed, then 
what is the theoretical or philosophical link that binds its protection 
to the other types of intellectual property? One might point to the 
fact that works, inventions, marks, and secrets are all products of the 
mind, of the intellect. In this respect, confi dential information fi nds 
itself perhaps more closely bound to the ideas and facts that are not 
the subject of copyright than to the expressions that are so subject. 
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And the subject matter of confi dential information may fi nd itself 
more often identifi ed with the disclosed information about a patent-
able invention than with any other aspects of the device of the pat-
ent. Furthermore, in defi ning itself as a product of the mind, 
confi dential information allies itself with many areas of information 
law that are not defi ned as intellectual property, such as privacy, 
libel, and so on. The Supreme Court has clearly shied away from 
characterizing the protection of confi dential information as related 
to property,16 because “the action is rooted in the relationship of 
confi dence rather than the legal characteristics of the information 
confi ded.”17 Without a clear philosophical underpinning, Canada 
may wish to be somewhat cautious about binding international 
commitments to such an “intellectual-property” device.
Canada might wish to be even more cautious when the device of 
confi dential-information protection has only a comparatively short 
history in domestic law.18 Canada’s fi rst clear recognition of confi -
dential-information protection was in 198919 – and the Supreme 
Court did not take the immediate opportunity to pronounce the 
existence of a cause of action in this regard: it did so only when no 
other new or old device presented itself.20 Since 1989, Canadian 
courts will recompense the confi der for a breach 
1 if the subject matter was secret or non-public – and then only –
2 if transmitted in circumstances of confi dentiality – and then only –
3 if the information would save the confi dante time, energy, and 
expense and is used in an unauthorized fashion to the detriment 
of the confi der.21
The current Canadian “device” for protection of confi dential in-
formation has at least three challenges that set it apart from the 
traditional intellectual-property devices developed in the past: it is a 
product of judicial decision rather than legislative action22 and thus 
at this point cannot be reviewed under the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms;23 it is an unbounded monopoly that, if the 
conditions of confi dentiality are maintained, can last forever (unlike 
patent or copyright); and it would appear to have no element of 
public interest, other than indirectly in terms of the arguable general 
public interest in the success of the national economy (including the 
national economy’s interaction with the success of multinational 
and foreign businesses).
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c a n a da  i n  t h e  i n t e r n at i o n a l
 i n t e l l e c t ua l  p ro p e rt y  e n v i ro n m e n t
 f o r  c o n f i d e n t i a l  i n f o r m at i o n 
 The Paris Convention
The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property was 
signed in 1883 and came into force in 1884. It initiated the inter-
national intellectual property norm of the principle of national treat-
ment. This principle requires that each member state guarantee to 
the nationals of other member states treatment in law no less favour-
able than is accorded the state’s own nationals.24 The convention cre-
ated a platform of guaranteed minimum standards for patent and 
trademark protection that each member country would provide and, 
through it, its members formed the Paris Union.25 As the Union met 
from time to time over the succeeding hundred years, new agreements 
were reached and came into force when a suffi cient number of mem-
ber states ratifi ed them. However, it was not necessary for every 
member state to ratify later instruments in order to continue 
as members of the Union. Even in the most recent version of the 
Paris Convention, there remains language permitting states fairly 
wide latitude in tailoring patent and trademark protection.26
Canada originally acceded to the Paris Convention as a dominion 
of Britain, which was an original signatory. When Canada began to 
act as a nation internationally it continued participation in the Paris 
Union,27 becoming a party in its own right in 1925. Before entering 
into the trade commitments that required full adherence to the latest 
version in the mid-1990s, Canada had adhered only to the adminis-
trative, but not to the substantive, provisions of the latest 1967 
Stockholm version of the convention.28
As the empires of the original architects of the Paris Union un-
ravelled, the texture of the Union changed.29 Originally, it had had 
an instant global span precisely because the European powers were 
able to include their colonies in its scope.30 This created an effective 
global economic environment – one of the earliest large, multilat-
eral, and effective ones.31 As the colonies became fully independent 
and chose to become members of the Union in their own right, the 
dominant economic interests of the Union, which operated demo-
cratically, began to shift – much of the enlarged membership con-
sisted of economically underdeveloped nations.
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The chief point about this consensual environment for internation-
al cooperation in the protection of industrial property is, however, 
that, throughout its history from colonial to post-colonial, protection 
of confi dential information has had no real place in it. The only con-
sensus that ever developed over the century following the creation of 
the Paris Union related to protection of confi dential information was 
a provision for protection against unfair competition.32
In the United Nations
After the Second World War, international instruments of the newly 
formed United Nations were drafted to include references to the 
intellectual-property devices represented by the much older inter-
national intellectual-property bodies, including the Paris Union, and 
these United Nations documents refl ected both perspectives inherent 
in traditional intellectual property: the reward for authors and cre-
ators but also access to information and innovation for society. Such 
references occur not only in the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights,33 where they might be expected, but also 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states:
1  Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life 
of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in the scien-
tifi c advancement and its benefi ts.
2  Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and ma-
terial interests resulting from any scientifi c, literary or artistic 
production of which he is the author.34
Eventually, in 1970 the Paris Union and copyright’s Berne Union 
formed the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO),35 
which was formally integrated into the United Nations system 
(where it remains today).36 At this point in the 1970s, however, there 
was no international instrument that specifi cally addressed confi -
dential information.
In International Trade Law
By the end of the 1980s the economically powerful members of the 
Unions, now joined on all fronts by the United States, which had 
formerly boycotted the Berne Union,37 chafed under the consensual 
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environment of WIPO.38 As Ronald Bettig points out, “[t]he global 
proliferation of communications technologies and the expansion of the 
realm of intellectual property is a process that clearly benefi ts the ad-
vanced economies of the United States, Europe and Japan.”39 When 
the opportunity arose, encouraged and abetted by increasingly global-
ized multinational corporations, especially in the pharmaceutical sec-
tor,40 these leading states shifted the conversation about intellectual 
property away from WIPO and into the modern trade environment.
The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, launched in 
1986 by the contracting parties of the General Agreement onTariffs and 
Trade,41 included a mandate to negotiate in the area of intellectual prop-
erty.42 The Uruguay Round was concluded in 1994 with the creation of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the inclusion of intellectual 
property in its mandate through the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). This agreement, which 
forms part of the WTO Agreement, contains provisions protecting undis-
closed information, particularly secret information with commercial 
value and data submitted for the purpose of regulatory or marketing 
approval. This development will be reviewed below.
The strategy of the industrialized nations in moving the inter-
national coordination of intellectual-property protection from the 
consensual environment of WIPO to the trade negotiation environ-
ment in the WTO initially proved very successful.43 Although various 
issues of disagreement between the industrialized nations that had 
become apparent during negotiation largely remained unresolved 
when TRIPS emerged, the overall approach of the developed nations 
prevailed, and “the developing countries’ proposal was all but for-
gotten.”44 Throughout this period, Canada’s domestic intellectual-
property policy refl ected the pressure of the United States as it drove 
forward to strengthen international intellectual-property protec-
tions in order to protect its exports:45 “the main impetus for change 
in Canada has come ultimately from U.S. corporate and political 
forces seeking to strengthen IP protection at the expense of IP dis-
semination ... Canada initially resisted such pressures but then ul-
timately adopted them as being in the national interest [emphasis 
added] in the new innovation age.”46 In every area of intellectual-
property policy-making, “by the late 1990s the federal government, 
in response to pressure and arguments from its industry and trade 
departments, was gradually adopting the view that the global agen-
da was in Canada’s interests”47
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While in the areas of patent and copyright, TRIPS48 drew on over a 
century of global experience, cooperating internationally to harmonize 
domestic intellectual-property devices by using the texts of the Paris 
and Berne Conventions as the threshold for patent protection and 
copyright protection, respectively, in the new trade environment, the 
international parameters of confi dential-information protection were 
laid out for the fi rst time in the coercive conditions of trade negotia-
tions.49 Through its inclusion in TRIPS,50 confi dential information has 
become classed for the fi rst time as intellectual property (whereas 
Canada’s Supreme Court has declined to declare it to be such.)51
Article 39 of TRIPS provides that
Natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing 
information lawfully within their control from being disclosed 
to, acquired by, or used by others without their consent in a 
manner contrary to honest commercial business practices,52 so 
long as such information:
a)  is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise 
confi guration and assembly of its components, generally 
known among or readily accessible to persons within circles 
that normally deal with the kind of information in question;
b)  has commercial value because it is secret; and
c)  has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, 
by the person lawfully in control of the information, to keep
 it secret.
Article 39(3) provides that “Members, when requiring, as a condition 
of approving the marketing of pharmaceutical or of agricultural chem-
ical products which utilize new chemical entities, the submission of un-
disclosed test or other data, the origination of which involves a 
considerable effort, shall protect such data against unfair commercial 
use. In addition, Members shall protect such data against disclosure, 
except where necessary to protect the public, or unless steps are taken 
to ensure that the data are protected against unfair commercial use.”
t h e  c l as h  o f  c o n f i d e n t i a l  i n f o r m at i o n 
w i t h  p e rs o n a l - data  p ro t e c t i o n
Meanwhile, just as WIPO emerged and the move toward intellectual-
property protection through international trade instruments got 
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under way, another area of law was emerging as a response to the 
developing information economy and information society: personal-
data protection.53 By the late 1970s challenges were being recog-
nized in the looming results of computerization – and, particularly in 
Europe, there was starting to be a nascent movement toward imple-
mentation of “data privacy” legislation. The value of “privacy” had 
been recognized and included in public international instruments 
that were created following the Second World War.54 But inter-
national consensus about how to operationalize “privacy” was not 
necessary, since none of these instruments55 were concerned about 
actually integrating information systems between nation-states or 
about actually guiding information fl ows that inevitably occur with 
the development of multinationals spanning jurisdictions. European 
countries began to seek domestic legislative implementation of pri-
vacy values in the face of the emerging data aggregation possibilities 
that occurred with increasing memory capacity, processing speed, 
and the ubiquity of computers. In less information-rich quarters 
than Europe, a concern emerged in reaction to the developing no-
tions of data privacy that enclosing information within nation states 
through “privacy” restrictions would doom information-poor coun-
tries to even less opportunity relative to information-rich countries 
in the emerging “computer age,” and that portability of data be-
tween states was very important to ensuring that all nations could 
participate in the anticipated information economy.56
The resulting compromise between these two reactions to emer-
ging telecommunications and computer globalization occurred in 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (of 
which Canada has been a member since its inception in 1960). The 
OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder 
Flows of Personal Data were published in 198157 and were intended 
to achieve two purposes: (1) to protect personal information58 and (2)
to ensure the free fl ow of data between countries.59 Over time, and 
with familiarity, the second of these two purposes has been routinely 
overlooked and forgotten.60 However, it is important to recall the 
dual nature of the purposes the OECD Guidelines were developed to 
serve, if only because the connection of the OECD Guidelines to pri-
vacy is convoluted.61
The OECD Guidelines were developed through consultation and 
are voluntarily adopted: not surprisingly, the guidelines do not dic-
tate to states what information they may seek from their inhabitants. 
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Their tenets are relevant only if a state or organization has decided 
to seek information from an individual.62 What is clear is that the 
guidelines are intended to give an individual who is a data subject 
controls on the use of information when the information identifi ably 
pertains to her or him and the information is in the hands of either 
public or private sector organizations.63 Organizations that fall 
under personal-data protection regimes are required to adhere to the 
dictates of national legislation implementing the OECD Guidelines 
so long as the information they hold continues to be identifi ed with 
an individual.64 This responsibility arises and continues whether or 
not the individual subject is even aware either of the information’s 
existence within that organization or of the contents of that infor-
mation. Moreover, in all Canadian jurisdictions, this responsibility 
continues for a number of years after the death of the subject indi-
vidual.65 The guidelines’ eight principles66 relate to the collection of 
personally identifi able information (not whether it can be collected 
but how it is to be collected and from whom), the organization’s use 
of such information, the dissemination of such information, the re-
tention of the information, and the disposal of the information:67 
legislation fl owing from the guidelines will control the entire life 
cycle of a record containing personally identifi able information 
while in the hands of an organization.
Since confi dential-information law is intended to protect any infor-
mation held in confi dence by organizations and since personal-data 
protection legislation gives individuals control over information about 
themselves held by organizations,68 there is inherent potential for con-
fl ict, or at least overlap, between these two legal developments.
c o m pa r i n g  t h e  l e v e l s  o f  i n t e r n at i o n a l 
c o n s e n s u s  s u r ro u n d i n g  p e rs o n a l - data 
p ro t e c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  i n t e r n at i o n a l 
c o e rc i v e  e n v i ro n m e n t  i n 
c o n f i d e n t i a l  i n f o r m at i o n
While the WTO has a current membership of 153 states, the OECD 
has a current membership of only 30 and while the WTO is a trade 
initiative with mandatory dispute settlement and sanctions avail-
able, the OECD has neither of these enforcement mechanisms. On 
the face of it, why would any country pursue personal-data protec-
tion in line with the OECD Guidelines with any vigour?
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Two reasons may explain the rapid spread of personal data pro-
tection in Canadian law. First, it is largely for domestic political rea-
sons that access to government-held information legislation was 
initiated across the country – and it was expedient and perhaps in-
evitable that personal-data protection legislation, also for the public 
sector, became linked with access legislation.69 Second, the European 
Union was still the dominant force in the realm of privacy in the 
world, and it developed a directive that was worded to convey an 
extraterritorial effect.70
In the result, Canada has responded fully to its obligations under the 
OECD Guidelines, albeit in the private sector largely spurred on by the 
European Data Directive.71 The United States, on the other hand, has 
largely ignored the personal-data protection initiative – dodging it en-
tirely for the private sector.72 And, indeed, recent legal developments in 
the United States such as the Patriot Act73 have undermined any pos-
sibility of personal-data protection in the private sector such as is legis-
lated in Canada. Clear evidence of the incompatibility between the 
current Canadian and American environments in this respect is the 
decision of the government of British Columbia to forbid personal-
data processing by any of its provincial or any municipal government 
bodies through any agency or operation in the United States.74
i s  t h e r e  e v i d e n c e  t h at  c a n a da’ s 
b e t t e r  i n t e r e s t s  l i e  i n  avo i d i n g
 f u l l  i m p l e m e n tat i o n  o f  i t s 
i n t e r n at i o n a l  o b l i g at i o n s ?
The Supreme Court in H.J. Heinz Co. of Canada Ltd. 
v. Canada (Attorney General)
Canada’s domestic experience with the parallel existence of both 
confi dential-information protection and personal-data protection in 
the private sector is less than a decade old. Already there are chal-
lenges within this experience. Two examples will be discussed as 
illustration. The fi rst is the 2006 decision of the Supreme Court of 
Canada in H.J. Heinz Co. of Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney 
General)75 involving the subtle interplay of protection of confi den-
tial information with personal-data protection in the context of the 
federal access legislation. The second is Canada’s evolving environ-
ment for innovation in the health sector.
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The majority of the Supreme Court in Heinz appears to have in-
tended a triumph for privacy interests.76 Instead, the key result of 
the case appears to be that an individual’s right under legislation 
involving personal-data protection can be exercised by a corpora-
tion without the individual’s knowledge. This result seems to run 
counter to the very structure of personal-data protection and access 
legislation as they have developed across the country: personal-data 
protections are drafted into the statutes as rights of “individuals” – 
carefully distinguished from legal “persons” in order to exclude cor-
porate “persons.” Corporations and companies, such as Heinz in 
this case (“artifi cial persons”), are classed as “third parties” in these 
statutes (with their own exemptions and protections related to protec-
tion of confi dential information), not as “individuals” directly entitled 
to personal-data protection. In the Heinz case, there were no individ-
uals involved in the proceedings, even though much of the dialogue in 
the judgments was about the rights of individuals. Heinz sought to 
require the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, the government agency 
subject to the Access to Information Act that was holding the informa-
tion subject to an access request, to withhold documents under the 
“privacy” exemption normally reserved for individuals. 
Heinz had been notifi ed of the request for access by the agency be-
cause of its possible interest in parts of the same information as a “third 
party.” As a potential “third party” under the legislation, it was appro-
priate that Heinz be notifi ed, in order that it could decide whether or 
not to make representations about why certain of the information, in 
which it could claim a “third-party exemption,” should not be released 
by the agency to the requestor. The majority of the Supreme Court 
noted that legislators in personal-data protection statutes have contem-
plated and provided for situations in which the individuals involved 
consent to release of information about themselves – since the individ-
uals who were the subjects of the information in question were un-
aware of the proceedings, they did not have that opportunity. The 
majority worried that under the federal legislation, absent involvement 
in the ongoing proceedings by the individuals who were the subjects of 
the information, the federal information and privacy commissioners 
lacked power to take direct action to stop the release of the personal 
information. The Court’s decision did stop the release of personal data 
– but neither directly through objection of the individuals nor through 
the actions of the information commissioner but rather indirectly 
through the objection of the third-party corporation, Heinz.
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It does not seem appropriate for the Court to have so empowered 
third-party organizations, albeit on behalf of individuals, when the 
Court itself identifi ed the administration of the act, as legislated, as 
inadequate. The majority convinced itself that the “Access Act and 
the Privacy Act must be read together, with special emphasis given to 
the protection of personal information.” A better interpretation of 
the legislative intent in these statutes is that they were intended to 
balance access to government information with control over per-
sonal information, by the individuals affected, in both public and 
private sector settings: protection and control are different concepts. 
The minority77 noted the power imbalance that has occurred with 
this decision: companies have control over personal-data disclosure 
that even the individuals involved lack. The majority, in the name of 
protection, wrested some control of personal information away 
from individuals, back into the hands of corporations.
While the result in the Heinz case, which gives control over the 
disposition of personal data held by one organization to another, 
outside organization, is inconsistent with the intent of the OECD 
Guidelines and might eventually create problems with European 
data exporters because of the European Data Directive, it appears 
completely consistent with Canada’s trade obligations with respect 
to confi dential information. If Parliament steps in to “fi x” this inter-
pretation of the Supreme Court and reasserts the control of the indi-
vidual over personal data, such a legislative intervention is bound to 
highlight the tension in the area of government-held information 
between the access and personal-data protection regimes and the 
protection of confi dential information that is represented by the 
“third-party” provisions in this legislation – legislation that prob-
ably is not entirely consistent with Canada’s obligations under the 
TRIPS Agreement.
Medical Innovation
A second looming problem area for Canada in terms of reconciling 
personal-data protection and confi dential-information protection is 
in the health arena. Although personal-data protection in the public 
sector in many jurisdictions across Canada has gradually affected 
more and more Canadian health-related organizations over the past 
quarter century, the coming into force in January 2004 of all of the 
federal Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents 
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Act (PIPEDA), intended to encompass, among other sectors, virtually 
all commercial activities in the health environment, has brought the 
challenges in the health sector into stark relief. Taken together, the 
various pieces of personal-data protection legislation now in place 
affecting health are intended to give patients full access and control 
over any data held about them in any medical environment. This is 
consistent with the OECD Guidelines.
On the other hand, the medical establishments in four provinces have 
succeeded in persuading their legislatures to pass separate, sectoral 
legislation for health (combining private and public sector personal-
data protection into one single act for the health sector).78 In order to 
have the federal Cabinet suspend the operation of PIPEDA in respect of 
health organizations involved in commercial activities now to be en-
compassed in the provincial sectoral health enactments, these provinces 
would like to have their legislation deemed equivalent to PIPEDA.79 
However, this has occurred in only one province – Ontario.80 The fact 
that the legislation in the others has not been deemed equivalent is 
strong evidence that these enactments are inconsistent with the federal 
government initiative in PIPEDA, as well as with the OECD Guidelines. 
Indeed, even in the case of Ontario, the provincial health enactments 
privilege, to a great extent, the traditional power of physicians and 
medical experts over the patient’s judgment about his or her own 
data.81 But even if all this personal health data protection legislation 
met the OECD Guidelines, there would still appear to be an unavoidable 
confl ict between the patient’s right to control information in this en-
vironment, as demanded by personal-data protection, and the right of 
entities to control confi dential information in this environment.
Canada’s Food and Drug Administration, through the Notice of 
Compliance (NOC) process,82 is responsible for “approving the mar-
keting of pharmaceutical ... products which utilize new chemical en-
tities,” to use the language of TRIPS article 39(3), quoted above, and 
requires “submission of undisclosed test or other data, the origina-
tion of which involves a considerable effort” (i.e., clinical trials)83 – 
and so Canada is obliged to “protect such data against unfair 
commercial use ... [and] against disclosure.” The only permitted ex-
ceptions to these obligations are “where necessary to protect the 
public” or where “steps are taken to ensure that the data are pro-
tected against unfair commercial use.” There is no permitted excep-
tion under TRIPS for meeting the personal-data control rights of 
individual patients in such trials.
Chap_12.indd   288 2010-05-18   13:39:27
 Confi dential Information and Privacy-Related Law 289
The regulation of clinical trials in Canada is currently controlled 
in large measure through the administrative processes of ethics 
boards, many of which are situated in universities.84 These boards 
currently operate through panels (none of which are required to be 
composed, in part or in full, by lawyers providing legal advice) mak-
ing decisions under institutional ethics policies whose drafting has 
been guided by the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct in 
Research Involving Humans,85 created by Canada’s three large fed-
eral funding bodies (the Canadian Institutes of Health Research 
(CIHR), the National Science and Engineering Research Council 
(NSERC), and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council 
(SSHRC)).86 It should be noted that the enabling legislation for the 
CIHR actually includes commercialization in its mandate: “encour-
aging innovation, facilitating the commercialization of health re-
search in Canada and promoting economic development through 
health research in Canada.”87 The Tri-Council Policy has been heav-
ily infl uenced by guidelines prevalent in the medical research en-
vironment of the United States, a feature considered very important 
by the Canadian agencies because of the number of cross-border drug 
trials that occur.88 The authority of this policy fl ows from the fact that 
funding from the three lead federal agencies will not be made avail-
able for research if the mandated ethics processes are not met.89 
 The current content of these ethics guidelines does not refl ect the 
new realities of the ubiquity of personal-data protection legislation 
in Canada today and the range of institutions that can be involved 
in any particular health study90 – although it would appear that they 
must inevitably come to refl ect this new legal reality.91 It seems dif-
fi cult to envisage how, if patient subjects have the access and control 
to which they are entitled under personal-data protection regimes,92 
these trials will be able to be conducted in a way that maintains the 
confi dentiality demanded in TRIPS article 29(3).
c o n c l u s i o n
Canada has a number of international obligations that arise from 
two different impulses in information law: control of secrets by com-
mercial entities and control of any information about individuals by 
those individuals themselves. Inevitably there are confl icts between 
the two. The international instruments involving each have arisen 
from different sectors entirely within the international community: 
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one, within the past quarter century, from the consensual but small 
OECD; the other, despite its rhetoric of a long and inevitable history, 
only just over a decade ago in the huge, coercive environment of the 
wto. Currently, Canada has entered into specifi c international obli-
gations in respect of each – and relatively recently has put law in 
place in respect of each.
Canada’s short experience in each of these areas of law is reveal-
ing practical challenges in respect of the other area. In personal-data 
protection, the Supreme Court of Canada has given the right to ex-
ercise the censoring of information about identifi able individuals to 
corporations whose primary objective is the protection of third-party 
confi dential information – and not to the individuals who are the sub-
ject of the information, as required by the OECD Guidelines to which 
Canada is signatory. At the same time, an attempt to legislate in order 
to overcome the Supreme Court’s decision in the Heinz case may high-
light the potential confl ict between confi dential-information protec-
tion, which Canada must protect pursuant to both TRIPS and NAFTA, 
and personal-data protection, particularly in the context of govern-
ment-held information.93 In health, any personal-data protection 
regime that is actually going to be in compliance with Canada’s 
international obligations under the OECD Guidelines has not only to 
overcome the power of the medical establishment but also, it seems, 
to ignore Canada’s obligations in TRIPS article 39(3). In an environ-
ment where health issues are a major source of international discon-
tent with TRIPS, where costs associated with health care are an 
increasing and major burden for Canada, and where health informa-
tion is increasingly important at the level of the individual, both as a 
subject and as a user, it would seem unwise for Canada to develop 
information policy in this sector merely as a reaction to internation-
al commitments made a few years ago and increasingly being dem-
onstrated to be in confl ict with one another.
Thus, in these and other respects,94 both the Canadian legal en-
vironment for protection of confi dential information and that for 
personal-data protection probably fall short of Canada’s inter-
national obligations. Indeed, it appears impossible for Canada to 
simultaneously fulfi ll both sets of obligations fully. Given this impos-
sibility and given the multiplicity of complex information relation-
ships involved in these areas (including perspectives, such as access, 
that are not part of either system but are protected in Canada’s 
Constitution), it would seem very wise for Canada to develop policy 
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in the light of its own understanding of its own information environ-
ment and needs, quite apart from reference to any obligations cur-
rently in place, and, eventually, to implement only law that has been 
fully and dispassionately analyzed from Canada’s own perspective. 
Once Canada has developed its own internally consistent and do-
mestically effective policy, it can then use that experience in the ap-
propriate international forums to try to assist in the elimination of 
confl icts between international information-related (including intel-
lectual-property) instruments.
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Vic., c. 33, which applied to Canada as a dominion) and ratifi ed effective 5 
December 1887. Canada’s fi rst independent participation in the Berne Union 
was through the Rome Convention 1928. Canada’s adherence to the Berne 
Convention remained at the 1928 level until international intellectual prop-
erty moved into the arena of international trade negotiations in 1986.
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 (2)  Any act of competition contrary to honest practices in industrial or 
commercial matters constitutes an act of unfair competition.
 (3) The following in particular shall be prohibited:
   i.  all acts of such a nature as to create confusion by any means what-
ever with the establishment, the goods, or the industrial or commer-
cial activities, of a competitor;
      ii.  false allegations in the course of trade of such a nature as to discredit 
the establishment, the goods, or the industrial or commercial activ-
ities, of a competitor;
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    iii.  indications or allegations, the use of which in the course of trade, is 
liable to mislead the public as to the nature, the manufacturing pro-
cess, the characteristics, the suitability for their purpose, or the quan-
tity, of the goods.
This provision was used as a “hook” to bring confi dential information 
into TRIPS, a provision in the Paris Convention that was argued to al-
ready encompass confi dential information and thus to lead naturally to 
inclusion of confi dential information provisions in TRIPS. TRIPS Art. 39 
begins: “(1) In the course of ensuring effective protection against unfair 
competition as provided in Article 10bis of the Paris Convention (1967), 
Members shall protect undisclosed information in accordance with para-
graph 2 and data submitted to governments and governmental agencies in 
accordance with paragraph 3.” See also the drafting history provided in
 D. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, 2d ed. 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell 2003) at 271. It can be seen, however, that the 
provisions of Article 10bis of the Paris Convention are actually far more dir-
ectly related to legal concepts involved in passing off and trademark.
33 ICESCR Art. 15 provides
 1 ... the right of everyone:
 a. To take part in cultural life;
 b. To enjoy the benefi ts of scientifi c progress and its applications;
 c.  To benefi t from the protection of the moral and material interests re-
sulting from any scientifi c, literary or artistic production of which he is 
the author.
34 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, G.A. Res. 
217(III), U.N. G.A.O.R., 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) at 
71, Art. 27.
35 WIPO was created at the Stockholm Conference of 1967 by the 
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. 
Canada ratifi ed on 26 June 1970.
36 Given the strict economic, trade, and commercial origins of the 
unions, this marriage between the intellectual-property unions, which 
now exist within the framework of WIPO, and the United Nations 
must be philosophically uneasy. This is despite the current economic 
interests of the majority of the UN membership and the language of
 intellectual property in other UN instruments such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. After all, these unions were formed
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to support and extend national legal monopolies to various 
international markets.
37 The United States joined the Berne Union in 1989.
38 Under article 28 of the Paris Convention, recourse to the International 
Court of Justice is provided – but this dispute settlement mechanism has 
remained entirely theoretical and has never been used.
39 R.V. Bettig, Copyrighting Culture: The Political Economy of Intellectual 
Property (Boulder: Westview Press 1996) at 5. Indeed, as mentioned 
above, the United States and Japan put forward the fi rst proposal to fully 
include intellectual property in the international trade regime. It was 
drafts by the European Union and the United States that Daniel Gervais 
identifi es as dramatically accelerating the process of negotiating TRIPS. 
See D. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, 
2d ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell 2003) at 16.
40 Pat Choate identifi es specifi cally “two US corporate CEOs, John R. Opel of 
IBM and Edmund T. Pratt Jr. of Pfi zer pharmaceuticals” as the progenitors 
of TRIPS: P. Choate, Hot Property: The Stealing of Ideas in an Age of 
Globalization (New York: Knopf 2005) at 18.
41 The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, concluded 30 October 
1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 4 GATT B.I.S.D. 1 (1969), was provisionally applied 
between its “contracting parties” as of 1 January 1948. It contained no 
direct provision for intellectual property. GATT was later reformulated and 
incorporated into the wto Agreement along with the TRIPS Agreement. 
See the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
(1994) 33 I.L.M. 1125.
42 See the Punta del Este Declaration, WTO Doc. MIN/DEC (20 September 
1986) at 7–8, quoted by D. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting 
History and Analysis, 2d ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell 2003) at 11.
43 I say “initially” because there was a backlash after the adoption of TRIPS. The 
Doha Declaration of 2001, to the extent that it addresses intellectual property 
at all, refl ects mostly the concerns of the developing nations. See Ministerial 
Declaration (14 November 2001), WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, especially paras. 3, 19.
44 D. Gervais & E.F. Judge, Intellectual Property: The Law in Canada 
(Toronto: Thomson Carswell 2005) at 541.
45 The United States and Japan put forward the fi rst notions of covering all 
intellectual property in the international trade environment in the late 
1980s: see D. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and 
Analysis, 2d ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell 2003) at 10.
46 In Canadian Intellectual Property, supra note 1 at 182–3, Bruce Doern 
and Markus Sharaput observe that in the copyright environment, 
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“copyright enjoyed an ascendancy in the 1990s because it was possible to 
Canadian policy-makers to cast it as a cultural policy which, unlike many 
other subsidy-based cultural policies which were seen as antithetical to 
market liberalism, could be presented as being entirely in keeping with ... 
pro-market framework rules.” Further evidence of the American domina-
tion of Canadian copyright policy is supplied through Ronald Bettig’s 
study by a scholar examining the American experience. See R. Bettig, 
Copyrighting Culture: The Political Economy of Intellectual Property 
(Boulder: Westview Press 1996). Many of the examples and case studies in 
his book involve the co-opting of Canadian intellectual property policy to 
the interests of the American entertainment industry elites. Canada is 
identifi ed as the American entertainment industry’s “largest ‘foreign’ mar-
ket in the Western Hemisphere.” Ibid. at 201.
47 Canadian Intellectual Property, supra note 1 at 183. Dan Dorner’s empir-
ical analysis of the federal government during this period of information 
policy development demonstrates also that the federal Department of 
Industry, more than any other agency, dominated policy formation at this 
time. See D.G. Dorner, “The Essential Services Policy Network: 
Organizational Infl uence in Canada’s Information Highway Policy 
Development Process” (2002) 72(1) Lib. Quart. 27–84. It was only on 
26 May 1996, however, pursuant to new trade obligations under NAFTA 
and TRIPS, that Canada adhered fully to the 1967 Stockholm version of 
the Paris Convention. For the same reasons, Canada adhered even a little 
later (26 June 1998) to the most recent version of the Berne Convention; 
see Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 
9 September 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, Can. T.S. 1998 No. 18 (last revised 
24 July 1971 and amended on 28 September 1979).
48 The signing of NAFTA, 17 December 1992, Can. T.S. 1994 No. 2, 32 
I.L.M. 289 (entered into force 1 January 1994) preceded the conclusion of 
TRIPS but was based on the same international drafting experience. See D. 
Gervais & E.F. Judge, Intellectual Property: The Law in Canada (Toronto: 
Thomson Carswell 2005) at 556. 
49 This probably makes the environment for patent and copyright much less 
risky for many of the players – even though they are now facing an en-
vironment of coercion, where non-compliance with obligations brings 
with it a dispute resolution mechanism and the possibility of trade sanc-
tions as penalty. In the area of confi dential information they have no prior 
experience of international harmonization. 
50 The language of NAFTA with respect to confi dential information protec-
tion differs somewhat from the language that entered the text of TRIPS, as 
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will be elaborated on below. However, it will be suffi cient at this point in 
the discussion to focus on the language in TRIPS.
51 Initially in International Corona Resources Ltd. v. Lac Minerals Ltd., 
[1989] 2 S.C.R. 574, 61 D.L.R. (4th) 14, and later in Cadbury Schweppes 
Inc. v. FBI Foods Ltd., [1999] 1 S.C.R.142, 167 D.L.R. (4th) 577 the 
Court canvassed a number of possible characterizations for the cause of 
action for breach of confi dence and declined to classify it specifi cally.
52 The phrase “a manner contrary to honest commercial practices” is defi ned 
in a footnote in TRIPS as follows: “For the purpose of this provision, ‘a 
manner contrary to honest commercial practices’ shall mean at least prac-
tices such as breach of contract, breach of confi dence and inducement to 
breach, and includes the acquisition of undisclosed information by third 
parties who knew, or were grossly negligent in failing to know, that such 
practices were involved in the acquisition.”
53 Perhaps because the social conditions that it was developed to meet were 
so new and on a global scale, the vocabulary in this area became value-
laden and confusing almost before any law was formulated – and the term 
“privacy” became identifi ed as synonymous with this new area. That iden-
tifi cation is not apt, as is described herein, nor is it serving well the de-
velopment of either the area of privacy law or the area of personal-data 
protection law. I have made this point directly in connection with a cri-
tique of the recent decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in BMG 
Canada Inc. v. John Doe, [2005] 4 F.C.R. 81, 2005 FCA 193. See M.A. 
Wilkinson, “Battleground between New and Old Orders: Control 
Confl icts between Copyright and Personal Data Protection,” in Ysolde 
Gendreau, ed., An Emerging Intellectual Property Paradigm: Perspectives 
from Canada (Edward Elgar 2008), 305–52. In Canada, only fi ve prov-
inces have legislated privacy. Quebec, Canada’s civil law jurisdiction, gives 
privacy its strongest and clearest legal expression in the Quebec Charter 
of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q. c. C-12. The original Privacy Act 
in British Columbia was the fi rst privacy legislation in common law 
Canada, S.B.C. 1968, c. 39, now R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 373, s. 1. 
Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Newfoundland are the other three common 
law provinces ( Privacy Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. P-24, s. 2; Privacy Act, R.S.M. 
1987, c. P125, s. 2(1); and Privacy Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. P-22, s. 3, re-
spectively), and in these three privacy is protected only in surveillance, 
eavesdropping, and certain itemized commercial situations. 
In the other common law provinces, neither the legislatures nor the 
courts have recognized such a tort. As the Manitoba Court of Appeal ob-
served in Bingo Enterprises Ltd. v. Plaxton (1986), 26 D.L.R. (4th) 604, 
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41 Man. R. (2d) 19, at para. 17: “It would appear that at common law the 
tort of violation of privacy in regard to disclosure of personal information 
has not been recognized in Canada. Neither counsel has supplied us with 
a case ... Counsel for defendants states simply that the tort has not be rec-
ognized although recognized in the United States of America.” 
The ambivalence of the common law in general towards privacy has 
been highlighted recently in Great Britain: Buxton L.J., speaking for the 
English Court of Appeal at paragraph 8 of Ash v. McKennitt, [2006] 
E.W.C.A. Civ. 1714., stated: “There is no English domestic tort of invasion of 
privacy.” Actions in Britain based upon English Human Rights Act, Art. 8, 
which legislates respect for private and family life (and incorporates Arts. 8 
and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights into English law), 
have been successful but have been founded in breach of confi dence.
54 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights Art. 12 states that “No 
one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy ... Everyone 
has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” 
55 Including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 
December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, Can. T.S. No. 47, 6 I.L.M. 368 (en-
tered into force 23 March 1976). Art. 17 of the ICCPR provides: “(1) No 
one shall be subject to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour or 
reputation; (2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against 
such interference or attacks.”
56 C. Bennet, Regulating Privacy: Data Protection and Public Policy in 
Europe and the United States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1992).
57 The OECD Guidelines were created as a Recommendation of the Council 
of the OECD, becoming applicable 23 September 1980, and are available 
at <http://www.oecd.org/dsti/sti/it/secur/prod/PRIV-EN.HTM>.
58 Although paragraph 2 of the OECD Guidelines, concerning their scope, of 
the refers to “personal data ... which ... pose a danger to privacy and indi-
vidual liberties,” the operative sections providing for the treatment of per-
sonal data, paragraphs 7–14, do not mention the concept of privacy, but 
rather refer throughout to the treatment of “personal data.”
59 Part 3 of the OECD Guidelines, paragraphs 15–18, is entitled “Basic 
Principles of International Application: Free Flow and Legitimate 
Restrictions,” and paragraph 16 provides specifi cally that “Member coun-
tries should take all reasonable and appropriate steps to ensure that trans-
border data fl ows of personal data, including transit through a Member 
country, are uninterrupted and secure.” Paragraph 17 provides that “A 
member country should refrain from restricting transborder data fl ows of 
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personal data between itself and another Member country [in cases where 
the Guidelines are met].”
60 For example, Mary Marshall and Barbara von Tigerstrom, in their chapter 
entitled “Health Information,” in J. Downie et al., Canadian Health Law 
and Policy, 2d ed. (Markham, ON: Butterworths 2002) provide brief hist-
ories of the right to privacy in international law (at 159) and the right to 
privacy under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (at 160–4). 
They then move on to a discussion of the OECD Guidelines, but without 
mentioning the second goal of the OECD Guidelines at all and putting the 
whole discussion in the context of privacy. They state that “[w]hile [the 
8 principles of the OECD Guidelines] are not all directly related to the pro-
tection of privacy, they provide indirect protection (for example, by limit-
ing collection of personal data), and, more generally, serve to safeguard 
the basic values of autonomy that underlie the right to privacy” (at 165). 
Halyna Perun, Michael Orr & Fannie Dimitriadis, in Guide to the 
Ontario Personal Health Information Protection Act (Toronto: Irwin Law 
2005), completely omit any reference to the OECD Guidelines in their 
introductory chapter, focussing entirely on privacy. See ibid., 1–18.
61 I have previously argued that personal-data protection is philosophically 
more closely akin to legislated confi dentiality law than to privacy law: see 
M.A. Wilkinson, “Privacy and Personal Data Protection: Albatross for 
Access?” in K. Adams & W.F. Birdsall, eds., Access to Information in a 
Digital World (Ottawa: Canadian Library Association 2004), 109–32 , 
where I point out that viewing personal-data protection from this perspec-
tive may help to explain certain decisions of governments to make public in-
formation that would otherwise fall under personal-data protection, such as 
Ontario’s decisions in the Adoption Information Disclosure Act, S.O. 2005, 
c. 25 and the Public Sector Salary Disclosure Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 1, 
Sch. A, or Nova Scotia’s decision in the Ministerial Education Act Regulation 
80/97, as up to N.S. Reg. 120/2006, concerning annual reporting of school 
board salaries, made under s. 145 of the Education Act, S.N.S. 1995–96, c.1.
62 Paragraph 7 of the OECD Guidelines referring to the collection limitation 
principle states: “There should be limits to the collection of personal data 
and all such data should be obtained by lawful and fair means and, where 
appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the data subject.”
63 Paragraph 2 of the OECD Guidelines begins: “These Guidelines apply to 
personal data, whether in the public or private sectors.”
64 The defi nition in paragraph 1(b) of the OECD Guidelines is “‘personal 
data’ means any information relating to an identifi ed or identifi able indi-
vidual (data subject).”
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65 Federal rules under PIPEDA protect an individual’s information until 
twenty years after death or one hundred years after the document was cre-
ated: see R.S.C. 2000, c. 5, ss. 7(3)(h)(i)-(ii). British Columbia has legisla-
tion with the same time frames: see Freedom of Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 165, s. 36. Nova Scotia has 
provincial legislation that protects personal information of deceased per-
sons until twenty years after death only: see Freedom of Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.N.S. 1993, c. 5, s. 30(c). Newfoundland’s 
legislation protects information for tweny years after a person’s death or 
for fi fty years after the document was created: see Access to Information 
and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.N.L. 2002, c. A-1.1, s. 42(c)(d). Alberta 
and Saskatchewan have statutes protecting personal information until 
twenty-fi ve years after the individual’s death: see Freedom of Information 
and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. F-25, s. 17(2)(i); The Local 
Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.S. 
1990–91, c. L-27, s. 29(1)(2); and The Freedom of Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.S. 1990–1991, c. F-22.01, s. 30(2)). Prince 
Edward Island’s legislation protects personal information for twenty-fi ve 
years after death, or seventy-fi ve years after the creation of the record: see 
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.P.E.I. F-15.01, 
ss. 15(2)(i) and 40(c)(ii). Ontario and Quebec legislation protects personal 
information until thirty years after death: see Freedom of Information 
and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31, s. 2(2) and An Act
 respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector, 
R.S.Q. 1994, c. P-39.1, s. 18.2. Manitoba’s provincial legislation protects 
information only until ten years after an individual’s death: see The 
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, C.C.S.M. 1997, 
c. F175, s. 17(4).
66 Set out in part 2 of the OECD Guidelines, entitled “Basic Principles of 
National Application,” at paras 7–14.
67 Paragraph 11 of the OECD Guidelines, the “Security Safeguard Principle,” 
provides that “Personal data should be protected by reasonable security 
safeguards against such risks as loss or unauthorised access, destruction, 
use, modifi cation or disclosure of data.”
68 Specifi cally, paragraph 10 of the OECD Guidelines, the “Use Limitation 
Principle,” states: “Personal data should not be disclosed, made available 
or otherwise used for purposes other than those specifi ed in accordance 
with Paragraph 9 except: (a) with the consent of the data subject; or (b) 
by the authority of law.” Paragraph 9 is the “Purpose Specifi cation 
Principle,” which provides: “The purposes for which personal data are 
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collected should be specifi ed not later than at the time of data collection 
and the subsequent use limited to the fulfi llment of those purposes or such 
others as are not incompatible with those purposes and as are specifi ed on 
each occasion of change of purpose.”
69 The best illustration of this relationship is the extraordinary passage of 
the federal Access to Information Act together with the separate Privacy 
Act as one enactment: see Access to Information Act and Privacy Act, S.C. 
1982, c. 111. The federal personal-data protection legislation, which ac-
tually had its antecedent as part 4 of the Human Rights Act in 1977 (S.C. 
1977, c. 33), before being re-enacted with the access legislation in 1982, is 
now the Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21 (Canada). The other personal-
data protection legislation for the public sector in Canada is the follow-
ing: Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.A. 2000, 
c. F-25 (Alberta); Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, 
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 165 (British Columbia); The Freedom of Information 
and Protection of Privacy Act, S.M. 1997, c. 50 (Manitoba); Right to 
Information Act, S.N.B. 1978, c. R-10.3 (New Brunswick); Access to 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.N.L. 2002, c. A-1.1 
(Newfoundland & Labrador); Freedom of Information and Protection of 
Privacy Act, S.N.S. 1993, c.5 (Nova Scotia); Freedom of Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31 (Ontario); Freedom of 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.P.E.I. 2001, c. 37 (Prince 
Edward Island); An Act Respecting Access to Documents Held by 
Public Bodies and the Protection of Personal Information, R.S.Q., 
c. A-2.1 (Quebec); Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy 
Act, S.S. 1990–91, c. F-22.01 (Saskatchewan); Access to Information 
and Protection of Privacy Act, S.N.W.T. 1994, c. 20 (Nunavut & 
Northwest Territories); and Access to Information and Protection of 
Privacy Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 1(Yukon). Several jurisdictions also have
 privacy legislation for the municipal sector: Municipal Freedom of 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M56 
(Ontario) and Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection 
of Privacy Act, S.S. 1990–91, c. L-27.1 (Saskatchewan). As will be fur-
ther discussed below, in four provinces health information, including 
health information held in the public sector, has been protected by 
separate legislation: Health Information Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. H-5 
(Alberta); Personal Health Information Act, C.C.S.M. c. P33.5 
(Manitoba); Personal Health Information Protection Act, 2004, S.O. 
2004, c. 3, Sch. A (Ontario); and Health Information Protection Act, 
S.S. 1999, c. H-0.021 (Saskatchewan).
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70 European Union, Directive on the Protection of Individuals with Regard 
to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such 
Data, EU Council Directive 95/56/EC, [1995] O.J. No. L. 281, p. 31.
71 In Quebec personal-data protection legislation for the private sector pre-
dates the EU Directive: see Act Respecting the Protection of Personal 
Information in the Private Sector, R.S.Q., c. P-39.1 (1993). However, all 
other personal-data protection legislation in Canada is a direct response 
to the federal government’s initiative, with the Personal Information 
Protection and Electronic Documents Act, R.S.C. 2000, c. 5 [PIPEDA], 
which responded to the EU Directive. The federal government, for consti-
tutional reasons, left room for, and indeed encouraged, provincial regula-
tion of private sector activities, and some provinces have taken up this 
invitation. The federal legislation anticipates the passage of “equivalent” 
provincial legislation, by providing that, once recognized as equivalent by 
the federal Cabinet, such provincial legislation will replace PIPEDA for 
provincial matters within that province: see PIPEDA at s. 26(2)(b). 
Quebec’s pre-existing act has already been recognized by the federal gov-
ernment as equivalent to PIPEDA. Several other provinces have passed 
legislation for the private sector but have not succeeded in persuading the 
federal government that the legislation is equivalent to PIPEDA: see, for 
example, Alberta, Personal Information Protection Act, S.A. 2003, c. 
P-6.5, and British Columbia, Personal Information Protection Act, 
S.B.C. 2003, c. 63. Consequently, organizations in those provinces 
must satisfy both regimes. As noted, several other provinces have passed 
specifi c personal-data protection legislation for the health sector. In 
Ontario’s case, this legislation has been deemed equivalent to PIPEDA 
by the federal government. 
72 See the International Safe Harbor Privacy Principles issued by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce (July 21, 2000), online: <http://www.ita.doc.
gov/td/ecom/Principles1199.html>. The principles were developed in 
consultation with industry and the general public to facilitate trade and 
commerce between the United States and EU. The EU was persuaded to 
accept this voluntary system as compatible with its directive. Few of the 
targeted private organizations have applied to be certifi ed. This record 
is to be contrasted with the fully legislated administrative schemes cre-
ated in Canada. Personal-data protection law is not an issue for organ-
izations in the American health sector. In this connection see further 
W.W. Lowrance, “Privacy and Secondary Use of Data in Health 
Research” (2003) 8 Suppl 1 J. Health Services Research & Pol. 
13–28 at 17–18.
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73 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 
2001, H.R. 3162 (2001).
74 Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act Amendment Act 
2004, S.B.C. 2004, c. 64 (“Bill 73”).
75 [2006] S.C.R. 441, 266 D.L.R. (4th) 675. 
76 Justice Deschamps, writing for himself and Binnie, Fish and Abella JJ. in 
the majority, clearly holds that privacy trumps access to government-held 
information and is “quasi-constitutional.” Promptly thereafter, the Federal 
Court of Appeal referred to Heinz in Canada (Information Commissioner) 
v. Canadian Transportation Accident Safety Investigation & Safety Board, 
[2007] 1 F.C.R. 203, 267 D.L.R. (4th) 451, acknowledging the para-
mountcy of privacy.
77 The minority (McLachlin C.J.C., Bastarache, LeBel JJ.) maintained that 
corporate parties should be limited under these statutes to claiming the 
exemptions specifi cally targeted for them by the legislators.
78 As noted, these are Health Information Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. H-5, (Alberta); 
Personal Health Information Act, C.C.S.M. c. P33.5 (Manitoba); Health 
Information Protection Act, S.S. 1999, c. H-0.021 (Saskatchewan); and 
Personal Health Information Protection Act, 2004, S.O. 2004, c. 3, Sch. A 
(Ontario).
79 As noted, the provision for this process is contained in PIPEDA s. 26(2)(b).
80 See Personal Information and Protection of Electronic Documents Act: 
Health Information Custodians in the Province of Ontario Exemption 
Order, C. Gaz. 2005.I.331.
81 In this connection see the study by W. Peekhaus, “Personal Medical 
Information: Privacy or Personal Data Protection?” (July 2006) 5:2 Can. 
J. Law & Tech. 87.
82 The Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27, as am., is the mechanism 
used by the federal government to protect public health and safety by en-
suring that only approved products are distributed in Canada. A food or 
drug product may not be marketed in Canada until a Notice of 
Compliance (“NOC”) has been issued under the Food and Drug 
Regulations, C.R.C., c. 870, ss. C.08.002(1) and C.08.004. The Patented 
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, S.O.R./93–133, were ac-
tually enacted under s. 55.2(4) of the Patent Act, R.S.C.1985, c. P-4, as 
am., and came into force on 13 March 1993. They were substantially 
amended in 1998 (C. Gaz. Part II, Col. 132, No. 7 at1051 (1998)) and 
again in 2006 (Regulations Amending the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Regulations Registration, S.O.R./2006–242 (5 October 2006)). 
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They are intended to link the Patent Act to the Food and Drugs Act by 
prohibiting the minister of health from allowing drugs that are the subject 
of a valid patent to be distributed in Canada by anyone not claiming 
through the patent.
83 A generic drug manufacturer who can show that the drug for which the 
NOC is being sought is equivalent to a drug already approved is able to fi le 
an abbreviated submission for the NOC without having to do extensive 
clinical studies: see Food and Drug Regulations, s. C.08.002.1(2)(a) 
and (g)–(i).
84 Many commentators considering the ethics process in health research fail 
to discuss the relationship of law to the process at all: see for example 
E. Whittaker, “Adjudicating Entitlements: The Emerging Discourses of 
Research Ethics Boards” (2005) 9 Health: An Interdisciplinary Journal 
for the Social Study of Health, Illness and Medicine 513, and M. Aita & 
M.-C. Richer, “Essentials of Research Ethics for Healthcare Professionals” 
(2005) 7 Nursing and Health Sciences 119. Even when legal parameters are 
acknowledged, personal-data protection is often overlooked: see B.M. nop-
pers, “Consent Revisited: Points to Consider” (2005) 13 Health L. Rev. 33.
85 Curiously, the composition of the boards, at least for biomedical re-
search, is meant to include someone knowledgable in law, but even in 
that area that person is not to provide legal advice. Membership of the 
REB shall consist of at least fi ve members, including both men and 
women, of whom “ a) at least two have broad expertise in the methods 
or in the areas of research that are covered by the RED; b) at least one 
member is knowledgeable in ethics; c) for biomedical research, at least 
one member is knowledgeable in the relevant law; this is advisable but 
not mandatory for other areas of research; d) at least one member had 
no affi liation with the institution, but is recruited from the community 
served by the institution.”
The role of the member knowledgeable in the applicable law is to alert 
REBs to legal issues and their implications, not to provide formal legal 
opinions nor to serve as legal counsel for the REB. An understanding of 
relevant legal issues and contexts is advisable for all REBs, although for 
non-biomedical research such insights may be sought from someone who 
sits on the REB only for specifi c research projects. The institution’s legal 
counsel should not be a member of the REB. Tri-Council Policy Statement: 
Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans (Canadian Institute of 
Health Research, Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of 
Canada, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, 
1998) at 1.3.
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86 In M. Hirtle, “The Governance of Research Involving Human Participants 
in Canada” (2003) 11 Health L. J. 137 at 148, Marie Hirtle asks, “[i]s an 
administrative model appropriate for what is closest to becoming the na-
tional standard for research in Canada or should other types of standards 
(ethical, legal, professional or scientifi c) be considered?” 
87 Canadian Institutes of Health Research Act, S.C. 2000, c. 6, s. 4(i).
88 For example, in the Ethics Review Board Application Form for Research 
Involving Human Subjects in a medical context at the University of 
Western Ontario, question 1.2 is “Is this a U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) monitored study?” The fi rst question involving 
Canada occurs later, at question 1.11, namely, “Does this project require 
Health Canada approval?” Question 12.2 accepts that the FDA may re-
quire access to identifi able or confi dential data for monitoring or auditing 
purposes: see <http://www.uwo.ca/research/ethics/med/hsreb-forms.htm.>
89 It is interesting that CIHR’s Commercialization and Innovation Strategy 
document of November 2005 includes a heading “Ethical Perspective,” 
which states “Conscious of the issues that arise from the academic/indus-
try interface and the potential for ethical confl ict between profi t and the 
public good, CIHR will lead an industry/university effort that will review 
and propose standards for ethical conduct of projects in the commercial-
ization and innovation areas.” Nowhere in the document is there a discus-
sion of the legal aspects of these relationships – or, indeed, any mention at 
all of the interests of patients involved in these processes. Patients are 
mentioned only as one of several designated recipients of one of the 
sought-after outcomes of the strategy: “accelerated drug and device de-
velopment, which would ensure prompt delivery of discoveries to com-
munity, caregivers and patients.” The description of clinical research notes 
that research is “a key ‘bench to bedside’ link. Unless the training and ca-
reers of clinical researchers are better supported, and the specialized facili-
ties for clinical research are available to clinical researchers in Canada, 
this will limit CIHR’s and Canada’s capacity for commercialization and in-
novation.” See online: <www.cihr-irsc.gc.ca/cgi-bin/print-imprimer.pl.>
90 The Tripartite Panel on Research Ethics has just released seventeen reports 
from working committees considering revisions to the policy statement: 
see <www.pre.ethics.gc.ca>, under “Publications and Reports.” Among 
these, reports such as the SSWC [Social Sciences and Humanities Research 
Ethics Special Working Group] Recommendations Regarding Privacy 
and Confi dentiality (February 2008) and the Ethics Review of Research 
in Multiple Settings and/or Involving Multiple REBs (previously multi-
centred ethics review): A Discussion Paper and Recommendations 
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(April 2008) briefl y comment on the need to reconcile the policy with ap-
plicable legislation. The conclusion that this need exists is also supported 
by empirical research, sponsored by the Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council of Canada, just completed by M.A. Wilkinson and M. 
Perry: for preliminary indications, see M.A. Wilkinson, “Social Sciences 
and Humanities Research and the Protection of Privacy in Universities,” 
a paper presented in the Privacy and Access Issues across the Professions: 
Ethics at Ryerson series (April 2007); online: <http://www.ryercast.
ryerson.ca/dmpstreams/ethics2007april/index.asp.>
91 The possible impact of personal-data protection legislation on health re-
search has been contemplated in K. Weisbaum et al., “A Voluntary Privacy 
Standard for Health Services and Policy Research: Legal, Ethical and 
Social Policy Issues in the Canadian Context” (2005) 14 Health L. Rev. 42 
at 44; D. Willison, “Privacy and the Secondary Use of Data for Health 
Research: Experience in Canada and Suggested Directions Forward” 
(2003) 8 Suppl.1 Journal of Health Services Research Policy S1–17–23; 
and D. Willison, “Trends in Collection, Use and Disclosure of Personal 
Information in Contemporary Health Research: Challenges for 
Governance” (2005) 13 Health L. Rev. 107.
92 Given the primary focus of the CIHR on commercialization and the bar-
riers to that process that differing provincial regimes and personal-data 
protection can pose in general, it is perhaps not surprising that the CIHR 
has taken a lead role in trying to standardize this area. The CIHR commis-
sioned the CIHR Best Practices for Protecting Privacy in Health Research 
(Ottawa: Canadian Institutes for Health Research 2005). Although the 
document acknowledges that the law in this area differs across Canada 
and that various statutes govern practice in each jurisdiction and although 
it states that its guidelines are not to be relied on (at 26), the document 
nevertheless purports to be able to give health care practitioners a uniform 
code of practice for anywhere and everywhere within Canada. As such, it 
is misleading. In the health legislation of the four provinces that have 
passed it, including Ontario, patients’ control over personal information 
has been muted to refl ect and preserve the professional judgments of med-
ical personnel by adding a notion of implied patient consent to the trad-
itional personal-data protection legislative standard of express consent in 
information situations (for example, see Ontario’s Personal Health 
Information Protection Act, S.O. 2004, c. 3, Sch. A, s. 18(2)). Under 
PIPEDA, express consent is the norm. It has already been noted that in
the three provinces, apart from Ontario, with specifi c health legislation 
in this area, patients may still have rights under PIPEDA and patients in 
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the remaining provinces and territories will have rights under PIPEDA in 
applicable situations.
93 Canada would probably prefer to avoid close scrutiny of its confi dential-
information protection provisions in the access and personal-data protec-
tion arena altogether. For example, under Ontario’s access legislation in 
the public sector, if an organization holds a trade secret or certain other 
information from a third party, that information will be released to a re-
questor unless it has been supplied in confi dence and disclosure would 
have one of a series of legislated consequences. This may be too narrow to 
comply with TRIPS, let alone NAFTA; see Freedom of Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31, s. 17. 
94 NAFTA requires protection of information of potential commercial value, 
which Canada’s common law test, set out above, does not cover, although 
NAFTA requires only protection of trade secrets and thus would appear to 
be narrower in that respect than the protection that Canada offers. 
However, under either the NAFTA or the TRIPS standard, Canada’s re-
quirement that the confi der show detriment and benefi t to the confi dante 
is probably a higher standard than the demonstration of “commercial 
value” in international standards.
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